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Abstract  
This article assesses to what extent the right to academic freedom 
as construed in terms of international human rights law, specifically 
UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Status of Higher-Education 
Teaching Personnel of 1997, is protected in the law of the 28 Member 
States of the European Union. It determines the elements of this right, 
to then operationalise these by way of indicators accorded numeric 
values in order to assess state compliance and rank states in terms of 
their performance. The article shows that there is retrogression in 
Europe insofar as the legal protection of the right to academic 
freedom is concerned. Institutional autonomy is being misconstrued, 
academic self-governance denied and job security eroded. These 
developments appear to be the result of deliberate policy decisions by 
EU Member States seeking to make higher education “the arm of 
national economic policy,” so as to ensure higher education will 
contribute to national GDP. 
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1. Introduction 
This article builds on earlier research where a preliminary 
comparative analysis of the right to academic freedom in Europe was 
undertaken based on parameters of measurement drawn from 
UNESCO’s Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-
Education Teaching Personnel of 1997.1 Since then, there have been 
significant changes in the legislation on higher education (“HE”) in 
many European countries, enhancing levels of autonomy (or, what 
policy-makers consider to constitute autonomy) of HE institutions, 
and limiting the extent to which academic staff are involved in the 
management of institutions, reducing the scope of their participation 
in strategic decision-making, while increasing that of rectors, deans, 
heads of departments, and external “experts.” Moreover, the law 
regulating conditions of employment for academic staff in HE is 
increasingly guided by notions of “flexibilisation,” legitimising the 
conclusion of fixed-term service contracts (without long-term 
perspectives) also at post-entry levels of the academic career and, 
further, the termination of service contracts on operational grounds 
without restraint. It appears paradoxical therefore that national 
constitutions and HE laws continue to emphasise the importance of 
the right to academic freedom. These circumstances call for a 
                                                          
1 See Terence Karran, “Academic Freedom in Europe: A Preliminary Comparative 
Analysis”, Higher Education Policy 20 (2007), pp. 289–313; Terence Karran, 
“Academic Freedom in Europe: Reviewing UNESCO’s Recommendation”, British 
Journal of Educational Studies 57 (2009), pp. 191–215. 
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renewed assessment of the state of health of the right to academic 
freedom in Europe in the light of UNESCO’s Recommendation. 
This article relies on the following five parameters of the right to 
academic freedom: 
1. Ratification of relevant international agreements and 
constitutional protection; 
2. Express protection of academic freedom in HE legislation; 
3. Protection of institutional autonomy in HE legislation; 
4. Protection of academic self-governance in HE legislation; and 
5. Protection of job security (including “tenure”) in relevant 
legislation. 
The analysis also uses a set of specific human rights-based 
indicators, spread over the five main categories of assessment, to 
measure compliance by individual states. A numeric value has been 
accorded to each indicator. Adding up the scores of states for each of 
these values makes it possible to rank states according to five core 
aspects as well as their overall protection of the right to academic 
freedom. 
Our article examines the legal protection of the right to academic 
freedom in Europe, i.e. its protection in the legislation of the 28 EU 
Member States.2 The factual protection of the right – inter alia as a 
                                                          
2 For detailed accounts of the results, see Klaus D. Beiter, Terence Karran & Kwadwo 
Appiagyei-Atua, “‘Measuring’ the Erosion of Academic Freedom as an 
International Human Right: A Report on the Legal Protection of Academic 
Freedom in Europe”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 49 (2016), pp. 597–
691 and, by the same authors, “Academic Freedom and Its Protection in the Law of 
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result of institutional, faculty and/or departmental regulations, 
policies and customs – will be analysed in subsequent publications, 
relying primarily on the results of an online survey on academic 
freedom, open for participation by academic staff in Europe since 
2015 until further notice.3 
2. The right to academic freedom: International human 
rights law and UNESCO’s 1997 Recommendation 
With regard to HE teaching personnel, UNESCO defines 
“academic freedom” as 
the right [of such personnel], without constriction by prescribed 
doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in 
carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the 
results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the 
institution or system in which they work, freedom from 
institutional censorship and freedom to participate in 
professional or representative academic bodies. All higher-
education teaching personnel should have the right to fulfil their 
functions without discrimination of any kind and without fear of 
repression by the state or any other source.4 
Besides these teaching and research freedoms, “academic freedom” 
includes at least three other aspects: self-governance by the academic 
                                                          
European States: Measuring an International Human Right”, European Journal of 
Comparative Law and Governance 3 (2016), pp. 254–345. 
3 The survey is accessible at 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/AcademicFreedomSurvey. 
4 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching 
Personnel (1997), para. 27 [hereinafter (the) (UNESCO) Recommendation]. 
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community, employment security (including “tenure”) and the 
autonomy of HE institutions. The various rights thus entailed by 
“academic freedom” must, however, be interpreted in the light of 
special duties and responsibilities for staff and students, and the fact 
that a proper balance between the level of autonomy enjoyed by HE 
institutions and their systems of accountability should be ensured. All 
these elements together make up what may be termed “the right to 
academic freedom.”5 
Over twenty years ago Manfred Nowak argued that international 
law has largely neglected the topic of academic freedom and 
institutional autonomy.6 This remains true today to the extent that 
international “hard” law (i.e. treaties legally binding on states parties 
thereto) is concerned. The right to academic freedom, as such, is not 
protected in the two U.N. human rights covenants – the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and 
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”) – or in any other binding instrument of 
international law at the global or regional level. Certain provisions of 
                                                          
5 For analyses of the right to academic freedom and its constituent elements, see, e.g., 
Terence Karran, “Academic Freedom in Europe: Time for a Magna Charta?”, 
Higher Education Policy 22 (2009), pp. 163–89; André Prüm & Rusen Ergec, “La 
liberté académique”, Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à 
l’étranger No. 1 (2010), pp. 3–28; Jogchum Vrielink et al., Academic Freedom as a 
Fundamental Right (League of European Research Universities, Advice Paper 
No. 6, Dec. 2010). See also U.N., Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 13, The Right to Education (Art. 13 ICESCR), U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, paras. 38–40. 
6 Manfred Nowak, “The Right to Education”. In: Asbjørn Eide et al. (eds.), Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, pp. 209–10. 
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the various human rights treaties may, however, be relied on to protect 
certain aspects of the right to academic freedom.7 Focusing 
specifically on the U.N. human rights covenants, three Covenant 
provisions provide protection for the right to academic freedom more 
comprehensively: Article 19 ICCPR on the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, Article 15 ICESCR on cultural rights – 
notably giving expression, in Paragraph 3, to the right to respect for 
“the freedom indispensable for scientific research” – and Article 13 
ICESCR on the right to education.8 
In 1997, UNESCO adopted the Recommendation concerning the 
Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel. With its goal of 
improving the professional, material and social position of HE 
teaching personnel, it also aimed to enhance the quality of the HE 
system.9 Although the Recommendation is not “an international 
instrument on academic freedom,” guaranteeing academic freedom in 
HE is a fundamental concern of the document. Various provisions of 
the Recommendation address aspects of academic freedom. As these 
constitute the most current expression of agreed international 
                                                          
7 See Robert Quinn & Jesse Levine, “Intellectual-HRDs and Claims for Academic 
Freedom under Human Rights Law”, International Journal of Human Rights 18 
(2014), pp. 902–12. 
8 For a detailed account of the doctrinal place of the right to academic freedom under 
the UN human rights covenants, see Klaus D. Beiter, Terence Karran & Kwadwo 
Appiagyei-Atua, “Yearning to Belong: Finding a ‘Home’ for the Right to 
Academic Freedom in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants”, Intercultural Human 
Rights Law Review 11 (2016), pp. 107–90. 
9 See Klaus D. Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law: 
Including a Systematic Analysis of Article 13 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2006, p. 280. 
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standards on the topic, they will be used as the basis for assessing 
compliance with the right to academic freedom in Europe in the 
discussion that follows. 
UNESCO’s Recommendations are not legally binding. However, 
since they have been adopted by the General Conference of 
UNESCO, they must be considered to reflect an international 
consensus on the specific subject matter dealt with. 
Recommendations “have a normative character in their intent and 
effects and the States concerned regard them as political or moral 
commitments.”10 Supervision of the Recommendation’s 
implementation by UNESCO Member States is entrusted to a Joint 
ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the 
Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel (“CEART”), a 
body composed of twelve independent experts – six appointed by 
UNESCO, six by the ILO. 
3. Developing a standard scorecard “to measure” the 
right to academic freedom in Europe 
3.1. The “legal” protection of the right to academic 
freedom: The requirement of legislation 
The Human Rights Committee, the body supervising 
implementation of the ICCPR, stressed that “unless Covenant rights 
are already protected by … domestic laws or practices, States Parties 
are required on ratification to make such changes to domestic laws 
                                                          
10 Yve Daudet & Kishore Singh, The Right to Education: An Analysis of UNESCO’s 
Standard-Setting Instruments. Paris: UNESCO, 2001, p. 45. 
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and practices as are necessary to ensure their conformity with the 
Covenant.”11 Likewise, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the body supervising implementation of the ICESCR, 
entertains the view that, in realising rights under the ICESCR, “in 
many instances legislation is highly desirable and in some cases may 
even be indispensable.”12 Although the Covenants do not 
unequivocally make the adoption of legislation mandatory, these 
Committee statements suggest that – to secure the effective 
realisation of human rights and to respect fundamental principles of 
democracy – all salient elements in the definition of the various 
human rights, the general framework authorising measures aimed at 
fulfilling them and possible limitations of those rights be contained in 
legislation adopted by national parliaments. Subordinate legislation 
as adopted by executive/administrative organs of state may then “add 
flesh to the bones” and operationalise the norms contained in primary 
legislation, but cannot substitute a “stable” legislative framework 
where it is mandatory. This article will assess whether states have 
complied with the requirement of adopting legislation protecting the 
different aspects of the right to academic freedom, applying the stated 
standards in respect of “legislation.” 
                                                          
11 U.N., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 13. 
12 U.N., Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 3, The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2(1) ICESCR), U.N. Doc. 
E/1991/23, Annex III, 86 (1991), para. 3. 
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3.2. The provisions on academic freedom in UNESCO’s 
Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-
Education Teaching Personnel of 1997 
The relevant provisions of UNESCO’s Recommendation may, for 
present purposes, be divided into four groups: 
1. Provisions on individual rights and freedoms in Paragraphs 25 
to 30, including “the principle of academic freedom” 
(para. 27); 
2. Provisions on institutional autonomy in Paragraphs 17 to 21; 
3. Provisions on self-governance and collegiality in 
Paragraphs 31 and 32; and 
4. Provisions on security of employment, including “tenure or its 
functional equivalent, where applicable,” in Paragraphs 45 
and 46. 
Together these elements may be stated to make up “the right to 
academic freedom.” A few words should be said with regard to each 
of the aspects protected, starting with “the principle of academic 
freedom.” Scholars have been described as “dangerous” minds.13 
Challenging orthodox ideas and beliefs and creating new knowledge 
means that, “because of the nature of their work, academics are more 
naturally led in to conflict with governments and other seats of 
authority.”14 For this reason, advances in HE depend not only on 
infrastructure and resources, but need to be underpinned by academic 
                                                          
13 Robert Quinn, “Defending ‘Dangerous’ Minds: Reflections on the Work of the 
Scholars at Risk Network”, Items & Issues 5 (2004), pp. 1–5. 
14 Karran (2009), supra note 1, at p. 191. 
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freedom (para. 5). HE teaching personnel thus “have a right to carry 
out research work without any interference, or any suppression, … 
subject to … recognised professional principles of intellectual rigour, 
scientific inquiry and research ethics.” They “should also have the 
right to publish and communicate the conclusions of the research of 
which they are authors or co-authors” (para. 29). They further “have 
the right to teach without any interference, subject to accepted 
professional principles,” “should not be forced to instruct against their 
own best knowledge and conscience,” and “should play a significant 
role in determining the curriculum” (para. 28). Academic freedom is 
subject to important duties and responsibilities, as described in 
Paragraphs 33 to 36. 
UNESCO Member States are obliged “to protect higher education 
institutions from threats to their autonomy coming from any source” 
(para. 19). Threats need not, therefore, necessarily emanate from the 
state, but they may also, for example, originate with private actors 
such as private companies commissioning research. Institutional 
autonomy is “that degree of self-governance necessary for effective 
decision-making by institutions of higher education regarding their 
academic work, standards, management and related activities 
consistent with systems of public accountability, especially in respect 
of funding provided by the state, and respect for academic freedom 
and human rights” (para. 17). There is no automatic link between 
institutional autonomy and individual academic freedom. A highly 
autonomous institution may offer its members only a limited degree 
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of academic freedom15 – thus the UNESCO Recommendation’s stress 
that institutional autonomy must be understood to mean autonomy 
“consistent with … respect for academic freedom.” The 
Recommendation understands autonomy as “the institutional form of 
academic freedom” (para. 18). Autonomy should further “not be used 
by higher education institutions as a pretext to limit the rights of 
higher-education teaching personnel provided for in [the] 
Recommendation” (para. 20). As indicated, autonomy is to go hand 
in hand with principles of public accountability, as described in 
Paragraphs 22 to 24. 
HE institutions must organise themselves in a way as will guarantee 
that decisions taken by persons/organs will be “in the best interest of 
science and scholarship,” notably by promoting academic freedom. 
This implicates a form of organisation in terms of which academics 
can sufficiently participate in the taking of these decisions. Clearly, 
by virtue of their training and competence, academics are best 
qualified to ensure that decisions taken are “in the best interest of 
science and scholarship” and support academic freedom.16 
UNESCO’s Recommendation contains provisions on self-
governance and collegiality. Self-governance entails that HE teaching 
personnel should have the right “without discrimination of any kind, 
                                                          
15 Pavel Zgaga, “Reconsidering University Autonomy and Governance: From 
Academic Freedom to Institutional Autonomy”. In: Hans G. Schuetze et al. (eds.), 
University Governance and Reform: Policy, Fads, and Experience in International 
Perspective. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 19. 
16 For this line of reasoning, see the Hamburgisches Hochschulgesetz case, Judgement 
of 20 July 2010, Fed. Const. Ct., Fed. Rep. of Germany, BVerfGE 127, 87, 
paras. 88–95. 
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according to their abilities, to take part in the governing bodies and to 
criticise the functioning of higher education institutions, including 
their own, while respecting the right of other sections of the academic 
community to participate,” and the right further “to elect a majority 
of representatives to academic bodies within the higher education 
institution” (para. 31). The closely related principles of collegiality 
that are to apply in terms of the Recommendation “include academic 
freedom, shared responsibility, the policy of participation of all 
concerned in internal decision-making structures and practices, and 
the development of consultative mechanisms.” It is pointed out that 
“[c]ollegial decision-making should encompass decisions regarding 
the administration and determination of policies of higher education, 
curricula, research, extension work, the allocation of resources and 
other related activities, in order to improve academic excellence and 
quality for the benefit of society at large” (para. 32). The 
Recommendation further stresses that “[s]elf-governance, collegiality 
and appropriate academic leadership are essential components of 
meaningful autonomy for institutions of higher education” (para. 21). 
Finally, UNESCO’s Recommendation emphasises that HE 
teaching personnel should enjoy security of employment, including 
“tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable.” In the 
Recommendation’s perception, tenure (or its equivalent) “constitutes 
one of the major procedural safeguards of academic freedom and 
against arbitrary decisions” (para. 45). Tenure protects academic 
freedom by ensuring that academics can engage in a free search for 
the truth without having to fear losing their jobs, for example, because 
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of the views expressed.17 Tenure and academic freedom are closely 
linked to scholars’ responsibility for promoting the interests of 
society as a whole through their teaching and research.18 
Paragraph 46 of UNESCO’s Recommendation envisages tenure to be 
granted “after a reasonable period of probation” – “following rigorous 
evaluation” – “to those who meet stated objective criteria in teaching 
… [and] research to the satisfaction of an academic body.” It entails 
“continuing employment” and potential dismissal only “on 
professional grounds and in accordance with due process.” The 
Recommendation allows release “for bona fide financial reasons, 
provided that all the financial accounts are open to public inspection, 
that the institution has taken all reasonable alternative steps to prevent 
termination of employment, and that there are legal safeguards 
against bias in any termination of employment procedure.” Moreover, 
tenure “should be safeguarded as far as possible even when changes 
in the organisation of or within a higher education institution or 
system are made.” 
  
                                                          
17 See Conrad Russell, Academic Freedom. London/New York: Routledge, 1993, 
p. 23 (“The point is not that academics may not be dismissed for their opinions: it 
is that they need freedom from fear that they might be so dismissed. Without it, 
they cannot be counted on to do their work well.”). 
18 The justification for safeguarding academic freedom and tenure is actually two-
fold: firstly, ensuring that scholars can engage in a free search for the truth for the 
benefit of society as a whole and, secondly, ensuring that scholars through their 
academic endeavours can promote the values of intellectual independence. See 
Ronald Dworkin, “We Need a New Interpretation of Academic Freedom”. In: 
Louis Menand (ed.), The Future of Academic Freedom. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 185–89. 
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3.3. The scorecard and modus operandi 
The four parameters – individual academic freedom, institutional 
autonomy, self-governance and tenure – will be accorded equal 
weight in the standard scorecard used “to measure” the right to 
academic freedom – 20% each. The final 20% to arrive at an overall 
percentage score for each country is accorded to the parameter 
“ratification of international agreements and constitutional 
protection.” Altogether, 37 specific indicators measuring state 
compliance, concretising the main parameters, have been identified. 
These are human rights indicators – indicators essentially 
operationalising the requirements of the right to academic freedom as 
protected under international human rights law. The indicators chosen 
will thus purposively not measure whether HE reforms in the 
countries concerned comply with requirements of economic or 
managerial efficiency, as such criteria are irrelevant in – and, in any 
event, subordinate to – a human rights approach as binding on all the 
states considered in this assessment. A numeric value has been 
assigned to each indicator, mirroring its relative weight as adjudged 
in terms of international human rights law. When adding up the scores 
of states in respect of each of these values, it is possible to rank states 
for each of the five parameters, but also overall. With a few 
exceptions (Indicators under A.1., and Indicators B., D.2.3. and E.3.), 
a three-point scale is applied in respect of each indicator, measuring 
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“full compliance” (full marks), “qualified compliance” (half the 
marks), or “non-compliance” (no marks).19 
Some detail on the scorecard will now be provided. For purposes 
of illustration, we refer to the example of the scorecard with the 
results for Austria, reproduced in the table below. The first column 
(A) reflects whether the states at issue accept obligations of “superior 
normative force” (in the sense of obligations not “merely” originating 
under ordinary legislation) relevant to the right to academic freedom, 
i.e. whether states have ratified relevant international agreements and 
whether their constitutions provide appropriate protection. Under 
column B, there is only one indicator, this enquiring whether HE 
legislation contains express provisions on academic freedom 
(primarily in the sense of individual freedom to teach and carry out 
research). Do these comply with notably the Recommendation’s 
criteria on academic freedom and do they show that academic 
freedom should serve as a guiding principle for activity within HE? 
Column C covers indicators on institutional autonomy. The indicators 
chosen here enquire whether there is a satisfactory, problematic or 
seriously deficient/no provision in HE legislation expressly 
protecting institutional autonomy, how each of organisational, 
financial, staffing and academic autonomy is realised in the law by 
reference to one or two legitimate key indicators in each instance 
(each aspect of autonomy weighted equally), how wide or narrow the 
extent of governmental powers generally are and, finally, as to the 
                                                          
19 Thus, Karran’s earlier method is followed in this respect. See Karran (2009), supra 
note 1, at pp. 197–98. 
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extent to which institutional independence is protected against private 
interests. 
Column D covers indicators on self-governance. The first 
ascertains whether there is a satisfactory, problematic or seriously 
deficient/no provision in HE legislation expressly protecting self-
governance. This is followed by indicators examining the state of 
self-governance at the level of the institution, and then another set of 
indicators measuring this at the faculty/departmental level. In each 
group, there is an indicator assessing whether academic staff are able 
to elect a majority of representatives to bodies responsible for 
decisions on academic matters at the respective level, i.e. the senate 
(or its equivalent), and collegial bodies at faculty/departmental level. 
In each group, there are further indicators on the respective executive 
officers directing the institution, or faculties/departments, i.e. the 
rector, and deans/heads of departments, ascertaining: 1. whether these 
officers come from within the institution or faculty/department, and 
hold a PhD/are professors, 2. whether academic staff can exercise 
“control” over who is chosen as the rector or dean/head of 
department, and 3. whether they can exercise “control” over the 
dismissal of the rector or dean/head of department by virtue of a vote 
of no-confidence. The provisions of the UNESCO Recommendation 
are closest to the primus inter pares model, in terms of which 
academic staff are to decide on “their leaders” (rectors, deans, heads 
of departments) themselves, choosing them from among themselves, 
for a certain period of time, after which they become ordinary 
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members of staff again,20 and, moreover, may express a lack of 
confidence in their ability to lead, where appropriate. In the group of 
indicators on self-governance at the institutional level, there is finally 
an indicator enquiring whether academic staff are adequately 
represented on the body/bodies taking strategic decisions (strategic 
planning, general teaching/research policy, overall institutional 
development, preparing the budget, adopting the HE institution’s 
statutes, etc.). Strategic decision-making would customarily be the 
task of the rector (rectorate) and the senate (or its equivalent) and/or 
– notably and increasingly nowadays – a separate board to which 
academic staff, external experts and other stake-holders are 
elected/appointed.21 Even if not necessarily to the same extent as for 
“academic” decision-making, academic staff should have a right to 
take part in strategic decision-making.22 
Finally, Column E covers indicators on security of employment, 
including “tenure” (or its equivalent). Indicators concern three 
topics: duration of contract of service, termination of contract of 
service on operational grounds, and prospect of advancement based 
on objective assessment of competence. Regarding the first topic, 
there is, for example, an indicator assessing whether the legal 
                                                          
20 In this vein, see Karran (2007), supra note 1, at pp. 303–04, with regard to the 
rector. 
21 On the typical governance bodies encountered in (European) HE institutions, see 
Eurydice – The Information Network on Education in Europe, Higher Education 
Governance in Europe: Policies, Structures, Funding and Academic Staff, 2008, 
pp. 33–42. 
22 For an indication of the scope of collegial decision-making, see UNESCO 
Recommendation, para. 32. 
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framework of the states concerned envisages permanent contracts for 
academic staff, alternatively, commencement on a tenure-track (i.e. 
during a first phase (usually that following the award of a doctoral 
degree), a probationary period or fixed-term contracts with long-term 
prospects). Regarding the second topic, there is notably an indicator 
ascertaining whether there is an adequate, problematic or seriously 
deficient/no provision in HE legislation protecting (not solely, but 
specifically permanently employed) academic staff against dismissals 
based on grounds of managerial efficiency. Dismissals on grounds of 
serious misconduct, a flagrant violation of scholarly duties, or two or 
more consecutive negative appraisals of work quality will be 
permissible, if due process rules are observed.23 Dismissals on 
operational grounds (i.e. restructuring, down-sizing, reorganisation or 
economic difficulties), however, should ideally not take place. They 
will only be justifiable exceptionally and provided all alternatives 
have been considered, appropriate priority criteria been observed, a 
formalised procedure been followed, and procedural safeguards been 
respected. Finally, as regards the topic of a prospect of advancement 
based on an objective assessment of competence: As academic 
freedom is to be protected by restricting dismissal, it should also not 
be infringed by preventing advancement in the academic career where 
it should take place. There should be procedures in place (also capable 
of being initiated by academics) in terms of which promotion is 
granted where defined scholarly criteria have been met as objectively 
                                                          
23 See UNESCO Recommendation, paras. 47(e), 48–51. 
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assessed, without the need for the academic having to newly apply for 
a higher position within his/her institution on a competitive basis. It 
will thus be assessed whether legislation makes adequate provision 
(e.g. through a tenure-track system) for such advancement. 
The assessment undertaken here considers only public institutions 
of HE and, from among these, only universities.24 The analysis 
entailed an examination of 30 European HE systems. States with a 
federal structure in the field of HE required a particular approach. In 
the case of Belgium, the HE systems of Flanders and Wallonia were 
considered separately. In the case of Germany with a different HE 
system in each of the 16 Länder, it has been decided to study the 
situation in the two most populous Länder, Bavaria and North Rhine-
Westphalia, where one third of Germany’s population live. Regarding 
Spain, certain powers in the field of HE regulation rest with the 
autonomous regions. As for the U.K., the situation essentially in 
England has been studied (more than 80% of the U.K.’s population 
living here), giving some consideration to elements of the Scottish 
system. The actual legislation of EU states as in force at the beginning 
of 2014 (including the HE Act of North Rhine-Westphalia of 
September 2014, however) constituted the primary source of 
information for purposes of the assessment.25 
  
                                                          
24 The assessment does not consider student academic freedom. Neither does it 
address artistic freedom. 
25 Citations from laws used here are largely own renderings of texts in the light of all 
sources available. 
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Country 
A. The Ratification of 
International Agreements 
and Constitutional Protection 
(20%) 
B. The Express 
Protection of 
Academic 
Freedom in HE 
Legislation 
(20%) 
Austria 
63,5% 
1. The Ratification of International 
Agreements (10) 8,5 
1.1. Global Level (6) 
1.1.1. International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Art. 19, 
Right to Freedom of Expression) 
[0–1,5] 1,5 
1.1.2. Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (International 
Petition Procedure) [0–1,5] 1,5 
1.1.3. International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Art. 13, Right to Education) 
[0–1,5] 1,5 
1.1.4. Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (International Petition 
Procedure) [0–1,5] 0 
1.2. Regional Level (4) 
European Convention on Human 
Rights (Art. 10, Right to Freedom 
of Expression) [0–4] 4 
2. Constitutional Protection (10) 9 
2.1. Provision on Right to Freedom 
of Expression [0–1–2] 2 
2.2. Provision on Right to 
Academic Freedom [0–1–2] 2 
2.3. Reference to Institutional 
Autonomy [0–0,5–1] 1 
2.4. Reference to Academic Self-
Governance [0–0,5–1] 0 
2.5. Robustness of Provisions [0–2–
4] 4 
Total: 17,5 
[0–2,5–5–7,5–10 
(x2)] 10 
− 0 – No Reference 
to Academic 
Freedom at All (Non-
Compliance) 
− 2,5 – Provision(s) 
Seriously Falling 
Short of Defined 
Standards (Between 
Partial and Non-
Compliance) 
− 5 – Mere 
Reference to 
Academic Freedom, 
or Provisions 
Revealing Various 
Deficits (Partial 
Compliance) 
− 7,5 – Some or 
Other Deficit in 
Otherwise 
Commendable 
Provisions (Between 
Full and Partial 
Compliance) 
− 10 – Academic 
Freedom Serves as 
Guiding Principle for 
Activity within HE 
(Full Compliance) 
Total: 10x2=20 
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C. The Protection of 
Institutional Autonomy 
in HE Legislation (20%) 
 D. The Protection of Self-
Governance in HE 
Legislation (20%) 
 E. The 
Protection of 
Job Security 
(and Tenure”) 
in Relevant 
Legislation 
(20%) 
1. Provision on 
Institutional Autonomy 
[0–2–4] 2 
2. Autonomy in Detail (8) 6 
2.1. Organisational (2) 
2.1.1. Autonomy to 
Determine Rector [0–
0,5–1] 1 
2.1.2. Autonomy to 
Determine Internal 
Structures [0–0,5–1] 1 
2.2. Financial (2) 
2.2.1. State Grant as 
Block Grant [0–0,5–1] 1 
2.2.2. Express 
Competence to Perform 
Commissioned Research 
[0–0,5–1] 1 
2.3. Staffing (2) 
Right to Define Academic 
Positions in HE 
Institutions and their 
Requirements, and to 
Recruit and Promote 
Academic Staff [0–1–2]1 
2.4. Academic (2) 
2.4.1. Capacity to 
Determine Selection 
Criteria for Bachelor 
Students and to Select 
the Latter [0–0,5–1] 0 
2.4.2. Whether or Not 
Bachelor Programmes 
Need to be Accredited 
[0–0,5–1] 1 
3. Extent of Governmental 
Powers [0–2–4] 2 
4. Institutional 
Independence vis-à-vis 
Private Interests [0–2–4] 2 
Total: 12 
1. Provision on Academic Self-
Governance [0–1–2] 1 
2. Academic Self-Governance 
at Institutional Level (12) 7 
2.1. Senate (or its Equivalent) 
– Composition [0–1,5–3] 3 
2.2. Rector (3) 
2.2.1. Academic Position or 
Qualification of Rector [0–0,5–
1] 0 
2.2.2. Determining the 
Rector [0–0,5–1] 0,5 
2.2.3. Dismissing the Rector 
[0–0,5–1] 0,5 
2.3. Participation in Strategic 
Decision-Making (through 
Senate or its Equivalent, or 
Otherwise) [0–1,5–3–4,5–6] 3 
3. Academic Self-Governance 
at Faculty and Departmental 
Level (6) 1 
3.1. Collegial Bodies (3) 
3.1.1. Existence of Collegial 
Bodies [0–0,5–1] 0 
3.1.2. Composition of 
Collegial Bodies [0–1–2] 0 
3.2. Dean/Head of Department 
(3) 
3.2.1. Academic Position or 
Qualification of Dean/Head 
of Department [0–0,5–1] 0,5 
3.2.2. Determining the 
Dean/Head of Department 
[0–0,5–1] 0,5 
3.2.3. Dismissing the 
Dean/Head of Department 
[0–0,5–1] 0 
Total: 9 
1. Duration of 
Contract of 
Service (8) 2 
1.1.Regulatory 
Framework [0–
2–4] 2 
1.2. Situation 
in Practice [0–
2–4] 0 
2. Termination 
of Contract of 
Service on 
Operational 
Grounds (6) 1,5 
2.1. Provision 
on Termination 
on Operational 
Grounds in HE 
Legislation [0–
1,5–3] 1,5 
2.2. Protection 
in the Case of 
Termination on 
Operational 
Grounds in 
Terms of Civil 
Service or 
Labour 
Legislation [0–
1,5–3] 0 
3. Prospect of 
Advancement 
Based on 
Objective 
Assessment of 
Competence 
[0–1,5–3–4,5–
6] 1,5 
Total: 5 
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4. The legal protection of the right to academic freedom 
in Europe: The results of the assessment 
The following six headings provide a brief overview of state 
performance with regard to each of the five columns of the scorecard 
and overall. Each heading provides concise information on trends 
identified, some examples and a country ranking in the form of a 
table. 
4.1. The ratification of international agreements and 
constitutional protection 
All 28 EU Member States have ratified the ICCPR (Art. 19 
protecting the right to freedom of expression) and the ICESCR 
(Art. 13 protecting the right to education) of 1966. The U.K. is the 
only Member State not to have ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR of 1966. Claims under Article 19 on the right to freedom of 
expression alleging that the U.K. has violated academic freedom can 
thus not be brought before the Human Rights Committee. In view of 
the recentness of the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
in 2008, only eight states so far (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain) have ratified it. The 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR entered into force on 5 May 2013.26 
Malta has made a problematic reservation with regard to Article 22 
of the ICCPR on the right to freedom of association, stipulating that 
it “reserves the right not to apply article 22 to the extent that existing 
                                                          
26 Status of ratification as at 19 Mar. 2015 as reflected in the online databases of the 
U.N. Treaty Collection at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
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legislative measures may not be fully compatible with this article.” 
All EU Member States are further bound by the relevant provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, as amended and 
supplemented.27 
The constitutions of all EU Member States protect the right to 
freedom of expression. Express provisions are found in the (written) 
constitutions of 27 states. In the U.K., this right should be considered 
part of the U.K.’s unwritten constitution.28 Whereas the provisions of 
the Greek, Irish and Romanian Constitutions are problematic (“partial 
compliance”), that of the Hungarian Constitution is seriously 
deficient (“non-compliance”). Article 14(3) of the Greek 
Constitution, for example, allows the seizure of newspapers and other 
publications in cases of “an offence against the Christian or any other 
known religion,” or “an insult against the person of the President of 
the Republic.” The Hungarian Constitution substantially constrains 
political campaigning in non-public media, and provides that freedom 
of speech may not violate “the dignity of the Hungarian nation,” in 
Article IX(3) and (5), respectively. 
Express provisions on the right to academic freedom – in the form 
of a right to freedom of science29 – may be found in the constitutions 
                                                          
27 Status of ratification as at 21 Mar. 2015 as reflected on the Council of Europe’s 
official Treaty Office website at http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions. 
28 See Eric Barendt, “Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom under the 
Human Rights Act 1998”, Indiana Law Journal 84 (2009), pp. 852–55. 
29 Although there are differences between the right to freedom of science and the right 
to academic freedom (see Beiter et al., supra note 8), the approach here has been 
not to differentiate between the two. The Constitution of Spain of 1978 protects 
both freedom of science (Art. 20(1)(b)) and academic freedom (“la libertad de 
cátedra”) (Art. 20(1)(c)). 
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of 18 countries.30 These protect the right either as part of provisions 
(also) addressing the right to freedom of expression (Germany and 
Spain), the right to education/educational rights (Austria, Finland, 
Greece, Italy and Sweden), rights related to science, arts, culture, 
universities and research institutions (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Czech Republic), or 
both the right to education/educational rights and rights related to 
science, arts and culture (Portugal). The provisions contained in the 
Czech, Greek and Hungarian Constitutions may be considered to be 
problematic (“partial compliance”). Article 16(8) of the Greek 
Constitution, for example, prohibits the establishment of private 
universities, thereby also preventing opportunities for diversified 
notions of academic freedom to flourish in different contexts.31 
                                                          
30 In the U.K., “there is no constitutional guarantee of academic or scientific 
freedom.” See Eric Barendt, Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative 
Study. Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 74–75. 
31 Art. 13(4) ICESCR protects “the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and 
direct educational institutions.” 
New Zealand Journal of Research on Europe 
Volume 10, Number 1, 2016 (December) 
 
26 
 
Table 1 – Country Ranking – Ratification of International 
Agreements and Constitutional Protection 
Country Percentage & Score /20 in brackets 
1. Portugal, Spain 100    (20) 
2. Finland, Italy 95      (19) 
3. Slovakia 90      (18) 
4. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovenia 
87,5   (17,5) 
5. Latvia, Sweden 82,5   (16,5) 
Average 78,04 (15,61) 
6. Czech Republic, Greece 77,5   (15,5) 
7. Belgium, France, Luxemburg 70      (14) 
8. Cyprus, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Romania 62,5   (12,5) 
9. Hungary, Ireland 57,5   (11,5) 
10. Malta, United Kingdom 55      (11) 
4.2. The express protection of academic freedom in HE 
legislation 
If constitutional provisions on the right to academic freedom 
legitimately may be rather concise, then – in accordance with what 
has been stated regarding the requirement of “legislation” – all salient 
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aspects of that right need to be concretised and operationalised by 
way of parliamentary legislation. Further detail can be regulated in 
subordinate legislation. A state’s Act on Higher Education should 
thus make it clear that academic freedom entails a right to carry out 
research, a right to teach and a right to study without undue 
restrictions. Ideally, each of these elements should then be defined. 
The Higher Education Act of 2006 of Bavaria (Germany), for 
example, provides in Article 3 inter alia: 
(2) 1. Freedom of research … shall cover in particular the topic 
of research, the methodological approach applied and the 
evaluation and dissemination of research findings. … 
(3) 1. … [F]reedom of teaching … shall, within the framework 
of the teaching duties allocated, cover in particular the holding of 
classes, including the way they are structured in terms of content 
conveyed and methods applied, as well as the right to express 
scholarly … views on doctrinal issues. … 
(4) 1. Without prejudice to study and examination regulations, 
freedom of study shall cover in particular the free choice of 
classes, the right, within a study course, to freely choose one’s 
areas of focus, as well as the formulation and expression of 
scholarly … views. … 
Furthermore, legislation should reflect that academic freedom 
serves as a guiding principle for activity within HE, as would be 
evidenced by “academic freedom” forming part of a general part of 
the HE Act on “general principles” and/or it being referred to in 
various contexts throughout HE legislation. Austria’s Universities 
Act of 2002, for example, in Section 2, entitled “Guiding Principles,” 
refers to freedom of the sciences and their teaching, diversity of 
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scientific theories, methods and opinions, and freedom of study, as 
essential principles to be observed by universities. References to 
academic freedom then recur in various sections of the Act: Target 
agreements concluded with academic staff must respect freedom of 
science and “leave sufficient room” to individual members of the 
academic staff in their research and teaching (§ 20(5)). Students are 
entitled to freedom of study in accordance with the provisions of the 
law (§ 59(1)). Academic staff may not be required to participate in 
scholarly work if this conflicts with their conscience (§ 105). The 
dismissal of a member of the academic staff is null and void if this 
has occurred because that member supported a certain opinion or 
method in his/her research or teaching (§ 113). 
The assessment revealed that the HE legislation of Austria, Croatia, 
France, North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia contains express provisions on academic freedom largely in 
compliance with generally agreed criteria on academic freedom. The 
provisions show that academic freedom serves as a guiding principle 
for activity within HE (“full compliance”). A second group of HE 
systems were considered to have performed less than wholly 
satisfactory (“between full and partial compliance”), namely those of 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Bavaria (Germany), Ireland, 
Luxemburg, Romania and Spain. Within this group, some or other 
deficit in the otherwise commendable legislative provisions could be 
identified in each case. A third group of HE systems (held to be in 
“partial compliance”), namely those of Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia 
(Belgium), Cyprus, the Netherlands and Poland, merely refer to the 
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principle of academic freedom in their HE legislation. Article 1.6. 
(Chapter 1, Title 1) of the Dutch Law on Provisions concerning 
Higher Education and Scientific Research of 1992, for example, 
solely states that “[a]t the institutions, academic freedom shall be 
respected.” The legislation in a fourth group of HE systems, those of 
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden and the U.K., does 
address academic freedom, but in a way less satisfactory than that in 
the previous group (“between partial and non-compliance”). There 
may, therefore, be a mere reference to academic freedom, 
simultaneously flawed in some respect or another, or there may be 
more structured provisions which, however, seriously fall short of the 
standards defined in UNESCO’s Recommendation. The U.K.’s 
Education Reform Act of 1988, for instance, in Section 202(2)(a), 
stipulates that “academic staff have freedom within the law to 
question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and 
controversial or unpopular opinions.” The Act recognises this 
freedom, however, only whilst simultaneously, and in the context of, 
abolishing academic tenure. In terms of Sections 202 to 204, 
university commissioners are to be appointed to ensure that 
dismissals notably for reasons of redundancy (which the Act 
legitimises) do not violate academic freedom. Finally, there is a fifth 
group of HE systems (Estonia and Malta), whose HE legislation 
contains no reference to academic freedom whatsoever (“non-
compliance”). 
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Table 2 – Country Ranking – Express Protection of 
Academic Freedom in HE Legislation 
Country Percentage & Score /20 in brackets 
1. Austria, Croatia, France, North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia 
100    (20) 
2. Germany 87,5   (17,5) 
3. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Bavaria (Germany), 
Ireland, Luxemburg, Romania, 
Spain 
75      (15) 
Average 59,38 (11,88) 
4. Belgium, Cyprus, Flanders 
(Belgium), Italy, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Wallonia 
(Belgium) 
50      (10) 
5. Denmark, Greece, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
25      (5) 
6. Estonia, Malta 0        (0) 
4.3. The protection of institutional autonomy in HE 
legislation 
HE legislation should expressly provide for HE institutions to be 
autonomous, detailing the various constituent elements of meaningful 
autonomy (organisational, financial, staffing and academic), to then 
weave the parameters of these into the fabric of the legislative 
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framework as a whole. Thirty HE systems having been assessed, the 
HE Acts of 9 contain an express and adequate provision on autonomy, 
20 an express, but in certain respects problematic or incomplete 
provision, and one a seriously deficient provision. Article 2 of the 
Spanish Organic Law on Universities of 2001, for example, contains 
a provision on university autonomy by and large satisfying criteria to 
be considered “adequate.” Paragraph 1 specifies that universities are 
endowed with legal personality and carry out their functions 
autonomously. Paragraph 2 goes on to mention various aspects 
covered by autonomy, broadly encompassing all four elements of 
autonomy. Paragraph 3 underlines that university autonomy is based 
on academic freedom. Paragraph 4, finally, points out that 
universities are accountable to society for the use of their means and 
resources. Externally, university autonomy should be buttressed by 
guaranteeing the sanctity of university premises, a principle long 
since recognised by human rights bodies.32 Article 55(1) of Croatia’s 
Act on Science and Higher Education of 2013 thus emphasises that 
“[t]he premises of the university shall be inviolable.” 
Concerning the assessment of institutional autonomy in detail 
(C.2.) in terms of compliance with certain key requirements on 
organisational, financial, staffing and academic autonomy (i.e., 
requirements, compliance with which may be considered to be highly 
indicative of a more general compliance with institutional autonomy), 
the results for overall performance regarding the stated key indicators 
                                                          
32 Regarding the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see Beiter, 
supra note 9, at pp. 599–600. 
New Zealand Journal of Research on Europe 
Volume 10, Number 1, 2016 (December) 
 
32 
 
reveal Austria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Malta and the U.K. to be the 
top performers. Wallonia (Belgium), Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Bavaria (Germany), Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Spain 
are found at the bottom of the table, with all other HE systems 
somewhere in-between.33 
Generally addressing the extent of government powers regarding 
HE institutions, a reading of a state’s HE legislation should reflect 
wide competences for HE institutions and a minimal measure of 
involvement of the state in regulating their activity. The state should 
merely supervise whether legal requirements have been complied 
with, but not review decisions on their merits. HE institutions should 
be in a position to enact most regulations and take most decisions 
without these requiring prior approval or subsequent confirmation by 
the state. In a handful of the HE systems examined, HE legislation 
reflects a very high degree of proximity between state and 
universities. In terms of the Danish (Consolidation) Act on 
Universities of 2012, for example, the responsible minister is granted 
wide-ranging competences to regulate matters or to lay down general 
or specific rules on a variety of topics. Most of the HE systems 
examined may be considered to be in “partial compliance,” about one 
fifth in “full compliance,” in respect of indicator C.3. 
                                                          
33 See also Thomas Estermann et al., University Autonomy in Europe II: The 
Scorecard (Final Report, European University Association, Nov. 2011), pp. 20–52, 
for an assessment of compliance by European states in the light of various technical 
indicators on institutional autonomy, including those chosen under C.2. 
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Finally, the independence of HE institutions vis-à-vis private 
interests should enjoy a notable measure of protection in HE 
legislation. There should be a clear statement emphasising that private 
funding may not compromise the independence of teaching and 
research in HE institutions, linking this to an obligation of HE 
institutions to reveal the sources and scope of private funding. It 
seems only one HE system roughly complies with this requirement. 
The recent Act on the Future of Higher Education of 2014 of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), in Section 71 on “Third party-funded 
research,” provides that a member of the academic staff may 
undertake such research, “provided this does not prejudice the 
performance of other tasks of the HE institution, his or her freedom 
in science, research, teaching and study as well as the rights and duties 
of other persons” (§ 71(2)). In Section 71a, entitled “Transparency 
regarding third party-funded research,” the HE Act then calls upon 
“[t]he rector [to inform] the public in an adequate manner about 
completed research projects in terms of [Section] 71(1)” (§ 71a(1)). 
In sum, one HE system may be held to be in “full compliance,” five 
in “partial compliance,” and all the others in “non-compliance,” in 
respect of indicator C.4.34 
                                                          
34 See Eurydice, supra note 21, at p. 85, on accountability measures for private funds 
in HE in Europe. 
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Table 3 – Country Ranking – Protection of Institutional 
Autonomy in HE Legislation 
Country Percentage & Score /20 in brackets 
1. Finland 75      (15) 
2. United Kingdom 67,5   (13,5) 
3. Croatia, North Rhine-
Westphalia (Germany) 65      (13) 
4. Ireland 62,5   (12,5) 
5. Austria 60      (12) 
6. Lithuania 55      (11) 
7. Estonia, Flanders (Belgium), 
Malta 52,5   (10,5) 
8. Latvia 50      (10) 
9. Poland 47,5   (9,5) 
Average 46,29 (9,26) 
10. Germany 46,25 (9,25) 
11. Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Portugal 
45      (9) 
12. Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain 42,5   (8,5) 
13. Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Romania 40      (8) 
14. France 35      (7) 
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15. Sweden, Wallonia (Belgium) 32,5   (6,5) 
16. Bavaria (Germany) 27,5   (5,5) 
17. Greece 22,5   (4,5) 
18. Hungary 12,5   (2,5) 
4.4. The protection of academic self-governance in HE 
legislation 
Also the core elements of the right of academic self-governance 
should be clearly articulated in HE legislation, and then be given 
concrete shape in the various provisions on the 
institutional/faculty/departmental governing and representative 
organs of HE institutions. Although it is in the interest of enhanced 
institutional autonomy to leave the regulation of many aspects in this 
context to institutions of HE themselves, essential features of the right 
to self-governance, such as those requiring academic staff to be able 
to elect a majority of representatives to the senate or requiring them 
to be entitled to exercise “control” over who is chosen as the rector, 
need to be guaranteed at the level of primary legislation. 
Thirty HE systems having been assessed, the HE Acts of only 3 
contain an express and adequate provision on self-governance, 12 an 
express, but in certain respects problematic or incomplete, and 15 no 
express provision. An example of an express and adequate provision 
on self-governance would perhaps be that in Section 26 of the Latvian 
Law on Institutions of Higher Education of 1995, referring to “the 
right to participate in the governance of an institution of higher 
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education and decisions of self-governance, and the formulation of 
internal laws and regulations of that institution,” “to take part in the 
taking of decisions related to the interests of staff, to participate in the 
meetings of collegial governing bodies of an institution of higher 
education, and to be given the opportunity to be heard,” and “to 
participate in elections of self-governance of an institution of higher 
education and to be elected therein.” 
A majority – ideally between 60 and 70% – of the members of the 
senate (or its equivalent) should be representatives of academic staff. 
Students should, however, also be adequately represented. 
Article 12(1) of the University of Cyprus Law 1989 to 2013, for 
example, contains provisions of such a nature as will ensure that there 
will always be at least 80% representatives of academic staff on the 
senate. 
Rectors should be scholars coming from within the HE institution 
they are to serve, the academic staff of that institution should be able 
to exercise “control” over who is chosen as the rector (for instance, 
by holding a majority of votes), rector and staff should govern “co-
operatively,” and the academic staff should also be able to exercise 
“control” over the rector’s dismissal by means of a vote of no-
confidence. Article 20(2) of the Spanish Organic Law on Universities 
of 2001, for example, states that “[t]he rector shall be elected … from 
among officials of the body of university professors active in it.” The 
assessment has shown that rectors increasingly may come from 
outside the institution, and often it is not expressly stated that they 
should be academics. Regarding the particular manner rectors are 
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chosen, the models employed are highly varied. As under Articles 6 
and 11 of the Wallonian Loi sur l’organisation de l’enseignement 
universitaire par l’Etat of 1953 (Belgium), academic staff may be 
entitled to directly elect the head of the institution (the vote of 
academic staff weighing 75%). As under Section 10(2) of Slovakia’s 
Act on Higher Education Institutions of 2002, academic staff may be 
entitled to take part in the rector’s election indirectly through the 
senate (or its equivalent). The general trend, however, is “to do away 
with” direct or indirect participation of academic staff, and to have 
the rector appointed by a “third body,” to wit, HE institution boards, 
many introduced in the wake of “new university management” 
policies en vogue since the 1990s. Customarily, all or the majority of 
the members of these boards are external, representing a variety of – 
including government and corporate – interests. The bodies 
sometimes merely perform a supervisory function, but in many cases 
they play a decisive role in strategic decision-making.35 In terms of 
the Swedish Higher Education Act of 1992 and the accompanying 
Ordinance of 1993, the government is to appoint a rector based on 
the proposal of the board of governors, the latter making the proposal 
following consultations with academic and other staff, and students. 
The board roughly comprises 50% external members, appointed by 
the government, and 25% representatives of academic staff and 
students, respectively.36 What has been stated regarding the particular 
                                                          
35 See Eurydice, supra note 21, at pp. 33–42, or Estermann et al., supra note 33, at 
pp. 20–29, attesting to these developments, but commenting on them neutrally. 
36 Swedish Higher Education Act of 1992, ch. 2, § 4; Swedish Higher Education 
Ordinance of 1993, ch. 2, §§ 1, 7a, 7b, 8, 11. 
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manner rectors are chosen may also be observed in as far as their 
dismissal is concerned. Some HE systems leave the powers in this 
respect to academic staff. In Estonia, the university council (being the 
equivalent of a senate) may thus, by virtue of Section 14(3)(18) of the 
Universities Act of 1995, adopt a vote of no-confidence in the rector. 
Nevertheless, also in this respect the trend is for those systems in 
which the rector is chosen by a board to grant the latter also the 
competence to dismiss the rector. Thus, in Denmark or Lithuania, the 
board appoints/elects the rector and dismisses him or her. 
In some of the HE systems assessed, the rector and the senate (or 
its equivalent) retain responsibility for strategic decision-making. 
This is so, e.g., in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia or 
Romania. As has been pointed out, however, increasingly, provision 
is made for separate boards, composed entirely or to a large extent of 
external members, with important decision-making powers in 
strategic matters. They are usually competent to appoint and dismiss 
rectors, often coming from outside the HE institution. The rectors (or 
sometimes rectorates) may be granted far-reaching executive powers. 
Together, rector and board decide on issues such as internal structure, 
the heads of units, teaching and research strategy, budgets and 
administrative set-up. It may well be asked to what extent the 
principles of self-governance and collegiality permit “managerial” 
governance structures being introduced in HE institutions. 
Strengthening the rector’s (rectorate’s) powers, or providing for a 
board making available external expertise and involved in strategic 
decision-making, would probably be permissible provided these 
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measures are adequately counterbalanced by securing effective 
participatory and control rights for academic staff, to ensure the 
system of governance does not become “detached” from the academic 
staff whom it should serve.37 It is submitted that academic staff 
should thus retain the power to elect the rector from among their 
midst, and, where appropriate, express a lack of confidence in him or 
her. Academic staff should further ideally have at least 50% 
representation on the board.38 An arrangement in terms of which there 
are principally external members on the board, and academic staff are 
in a position to determine most of these, would perhaps still pass 
muster, but only at the level of “partial compliance” (see, e.g., 
Austria39). In Portugal, the general council (replacing general 
assembly and senate) has a majority of representatives of academic 
staff, and at least 30% external members.40 In post-1992 English 
universities, at least half of the 12 (13) to 24 (25) members of the 
governing body must be “independent.” Up to two members may be 
teachers at the institution nominated by the academic board. There are 
                                                          
37 To this effect, see the Hamburgisches Hochschulgesetz case, supra note 16, 
paras. 88–95. 
38 See Lewis Elton, “Collegiality and Complexity: Humboldt’s Relevance to British 
Universities Today”, Higher Education Quarterly 62 (2008), p. 232 (stressing the 
need for “a democratic form of leadership, distributed throughout an organisation, 
very different from the current form of top-down leadership” in HE), and p. 233 
(emphasising that the vice-chancellor should be the “university’s first servant”). 
See also Michael Shattock, “Re-balancing Modern Concepts of University 
Governance”, Higher Education Quarterly 56 (2002), p. 240 (arguing in support of 
“moving back to a more evenly balanced approach to governance – the ‘shared 
governance’ concept”). 
39 Austrian Universities Act of 2002, § 21(6) (50% of the board members 
“determined” by academic staff, 50% by the government). 
40 Portuguese Law on the Legal Status of Institutions of Higher Education of 2007, 
Art. 81. 
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further one to nine co-opted members among the members who could 
potentially be teachers at the institution.41 
The above enquiry has been replicated at the level of the units of 
HE institutions (faculties and departments). A number of the HE 
systems assessed (Austria, Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), 
Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the U.K.) fail to regulate the right 
of self-governance at the unit level whatsoever, or they do so in a 
clearly insufficient way. 
Table 4 – Country Ranking – Protection of Academic Self-
Governance in HE Legislation 
Country Percentage & Score /20 in brackets 
1. Bulgaria 72,5   (14,5) 
2. Croatia 70      (14) 
3. Cyprus, North Rhine-
Westphalia (Germany), 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
62,5   (12,5) 
4. Germany 61,25 (12,25) 
5. Bavaria (Germany), Spain 60      (12) 
6. Portugal 57,5   (11,5) 
7. Czech Republic, Slovenia 55      (11) 
                                                          
41 Education Reform Act of 1988, sched. 7A, para. 3 (composition of governing 
body). 
New Zealand Journal of Research on Europe 
Volume 10, Number 1, 2016 (December) 
 
41 
 
8. Greece, Latvia 52,5   (10,5) 
9. Austria, Hungary 45      (9) 
Average 42,99 (8,6) 
10. Wallonia (Belgium), Italy 40      (8) 
11. Belgium 37,5   (7,5) 
12. Flanders (Belgium) 35      (7) 
13. Denmark, France 32,5   (6,5) 
14. Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta 30      (6) 
15. Netherlands 27,5   (5,5) 
16. Estonia 22,5   (4,5) 
17. Finland, Ireland, Sweden 15      (3) 
18. United Kingdom 0        (0) 
4.5. The protection of job security (including “tenure”) in 
relevant legislation 
The legal framework governing the duration of contracts of service 
of academic staff in HE at post-entry levels should envisage 
permanent contracts/commencement on a tenure-track. HE systems 
whose laws are in compliance with this requirement include, amongst 
others, Flanders (Belgium), Bulgaria or France. Article V.28 of the 
Flemish Codification of the Decretal Provisions concerning Higher 
Education of 2013 (Belgium) thus provides for full-time members of 
the “independent academic staff” to be appointed, further stating that 
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“[t]he university administration may, in the case of a first 
appointment as a member of the independent academic staff, appoint 
a person on a fixed-term basis … for a period not exceeding three 
years with the prospect of a permanent appointment without new 
vacancy, if the university administration assesses the performance of 
the person concerned positively.” The legal framework of some of the 
HE systems assessed – for example that in place in Austria or the 
Czech Republic – leaves it to HE institutions themselves to decide 
whether or not to offer permanent contracts.42 In these cases, the use 
of fixed-term contracts may be subject to fairly strict limitations as to 
legitimate cases of use, maximum number of successive contracts and 
their maximum cumulated duration, as is the case in Austria,43 but it 
may also be subject to rather lax requirements in this regard, as is the 
case in the Czech Republic.44 Whereas cases such as that of Austria 
should be held to constitute instances of “partial compliance,” those 
in the nature of the Czech example should be considered cases of 
“non-compliance.” Clearly also “in non-compliance” are HE systems, 
whose legal framework expressly envisages fixed-term contracts for 
academic staff at post-entry levels, even those with senior positions 
(associate or full professors), there being little or no prospect of 
permanent contracts being concluded. The Estonian Universities Act 
of 1995, in Section 39(1), thus states that “[t]he positions of regular 
                                                          
42 In Austria, in terms of the Collective Agreement for Employees of Universities of 
2013, permanent contracts are to be concluded with professors and associate 
professor. Such security of employment should, however, already be available 
under parliamentary legislation and not depend on volatile collective bargaining. 
43 Austrian Universities Act of 2002, § 109(1), (2). 
44 Czech Labour Code of 2006, § 39. 
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teaching and research staff at a university shall be filled for up to five 
years by way of public competition ….” It is further stipulated, in 
Section 391(1) that “[t]he successive conclusion of fixed-term 
employment contracts with teaching or research staff shall not cause 
the employment relationship to become one for an unlimited term.” 
In fact, “[a]n employment contract for an unlimited term shall [only] 
be concluded with a person who has been employed in the same 
university and has worked as a professor for at least eleven years, 
following evaluation under conditions and procedures established by 
the council of the university” (§ 391(2))! 
None of the HE Acts examined containing a full-fledged safeguard 
clause in this regard, the HE legislation of roughly a third of the HE 
systems assessed either contains provisions purporting to prohibit 
dismissals of academic staff on operational grounds (restructuring, 
down-sizing, reorganisation or economic difficulties) or laying down 
some protective standards for cases where such dismissals take place. 
Ireland and Portugal expressis verbis require academic staff to enjoy 
“tenure.” Section 25(6) of the Irish Universities Act of 1997 insists 
that “[a] university … shall provide for the tenure of officers.”45 
Article 50 of the Portuguese Law on the Legal Status of Institutions 
of Higher Education of 2007 states that, “[s]o as to guarantee their 
scientific and pedagogical autonomy, higher education institutions 
must have a permanent staff of teachers and researchers benefiting 
from an enhanced level of employment stability (tenure).” In a 
                                                          
45 See the Irish Universities Act of 1997, § 3, for a definition of the term “officer.” 
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number of HE systems, all or at any rate senior members of the 
academic staff are civil/public servants/public sector workers, i.e. not 
“ordinary” employees in terms of private law. This status may entail 
their dismissal on operational grounds being excluded (even where 
HE legislation does not expressly affirm such protection). Such status 
entailing prohibition of dismissal exists in Flanders (Belgium), 
Wallonia (Belgium), Croatia, Cyprus, Bavaria (Germany), North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. In the case of France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Slovenia, 
academic staff who are civil servants may (at least in theory) be 
dismissed on operational grounds.46 
Adequate provision for advancement of academic staff to a higher 
position based on an objective assessment of competence should be 
made. Some of the HE systems assessed do so through a tenure-track 
system.47 A tenure-track system of this nature entailing promotion 
from researcher to associate professor is thus envisaged in 
Article 24(5) of the Italian Law of 30 December 2010, No. 240, on 
Rules on the Organisation of Universities, Academic Staff and 
Recruitment, as well as Governance to Enhance the Quality and 
Efficiency of the University System. Other HE systems create 
                                                          
46 See Christoph Demmke & Timo Moilanen, The Future of Public Employment in 
Central Public Administration: Restructuring in Times of Government 
Transformation and the Impact on Status Development (Study Commissioned by 
the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Nov. 2012), p. 49. 
47 For an overview of tenure-track systems (most of them not based on general 
legislation) in some European countries, see Hans-Jochen Schiewer et al., Tenure 
and Tenure Track at LERU Universities: Models for Attractive Research Careers 
in Europe (League of European Research Universities, Advice Paper No. 17, Sept. 
2014). 
New Zealand Journal of Research on Europe 
Volume 10, Number 1, 2016 (December) 
 
45 
 
entitlements relating to promotion otherwise than through a tenure-
track system. Article 18(3) of the Greek Law on Structure, 
Functioning, Quality Assurance of Studies and Internationalisation 
of Higher Education Institutions of 2011 lays down that “assistant 
and associate professors have the right to request a vacancy at the next 
level after a stay at the rank they hold after six and four years, 
respectively …. If assistant and associate professors are not promoted 
to the next level, they have the right to request a re-announcement of 
the position after a lapse of at least three years following the decision 
not to be promoted.” At the opposite end of the scale are HE systems 
such as that of Lithuania, Article 65(4) of its Law on Higher 
Education and Research of 2009 providing that “[p]ersons shall gain 
access to a higher position in the teaching or research staff by way of 
an open competition [only].” Altogether, HE systems fail to 
adequately deal with the issue of advancement. Only the Greek 
arrangements have been considered to be in “full compliance,” those 
of 16 other HE systems in “non-compliance.” 
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Table 5 – Country Ranking – Protection of Job Security 
(including “Tenure”) in Relevant Legislation 
Country Percentage & Score /20 in brackets 
1. Greece 100    (20) 
2. France 77,5   (15,5) 
3. Italy 57,5   (11,5) 
4. Spain 55      (11) 
5. Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia 52,5   (10,5) 
6. Flanders (Belgium), Cyprus 50      (10) 
7. Bulgaria 47,5   (9,5) 
8. Belgium 46,25 (9,25) 
9. Wallonia (Belgium), Malta, 
Sweden 42,5   (8,5) 
10. Bavaria (Germany), North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), 
Germany, Hungary 
40      (8) 
Average 37,28 (7,46) 
11. Netherlands 35      (7) 
12. Denmark, Romania, United 
Kingdom 27,5   (5,5) 
13. Austria, Lithuania, Poland 25      (5) 
14. Croatia 22,5   (4,5) 
15. Luxemburg 17,5   (3,5) 
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16. Finland, Latvia 15      (3) 
17. Czech Republic 10      (2) 
18. Estonia, Slovakia 7,5     (1,5) 
4.6. Overall results 
The following table shows the overall country ranking for the legal 
protection of the right to academic freedom in Europe. 
Table 6 – Overall Country Ranking: Legal Protection of 
the Right to Academic Freedom in Europe 
Country Total (%) & Grade (A-
F) 
1. North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Germany) 
71                                                      
B 
2. Croatia 69                                                      
C 
3. Spain 66,5                                                   
C 
4. Bulgaria 65,5                                                   
C 
5. Germany 64,5                                                   
C 
6. Austria 63,5                                                   
C 
7. France 63                                                      
C 
8. Portugal 61                                                      
C 
9. Slovakia 60,5                                                   
C 
10. Latvia 60                                                      
C 
New Zealand Journal of Research on Europe 
Volume 10, Number 1, 2016 (December) 
 
48 
 
11. Lithuania 59,5                                                   
D 
12. Bavaria (Germany) 58                                                      
D 
13. Italy 57,5                                                   
D 
14. Greece 55,5                                                   
D 
15. Finland 55                                                      
D 
16. Poland 54,5                                                   
D 
17. Romania 53,5                                                   
D 
18. Cyprus 53                                                      
D 
Average 52,79                                                 
D 
19. Ireland, Slovenia 52,5                                                   
D 
20. Czech Republic, Flanders 
(Belgium) 
51,5                                                   
D 
21. Belgium 49,25                                                 
E 
22. Luxemburg 47,5                                                   
E 
23. Wallonia (Belgium) 47                                                      
E 
24. Netherlands 44                                                      
E 
25. Sweden 39,5                                                   
F 
26. Denmark 38,5                                                   
F 
27. Hungary, Malta 36                                                      
F 
